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Abstract 
This paper investigates how aspects of policy networks facilitate or inhibit the efforts of 
public bureaucracies to adopt and implement science policy innovations. Three correlated 
dimensions of policy networks – permeability, size, and tie strength – strongly influence 
adoption and implementation outcomes. Policy networks tend to expand and contract cyclically 
along these network dimensions.  
 Policy adoption and implementation are not binary variables, but rather continually 
occurring processes that also cycle. Successful adoption and implementation outcomes are most 
likely when adoption-implementation and network expansion-contraction cycles are aligned such 
that adoption occurs when the policy network is more permeable, larger, and more laden with 
weaker ties, and implementation occurs when the network is less permeable, smaller, and more 
laden with stronger ties. When cycles are not optimally aligned, adoption and implementation 
efforts are more likely to fail or stall. 
 These arguments draw on literature concerning policy networks as well as collective 
action and social capital. They are illustrated with case sketches that describe the attempts by 
environmental bureaucrats in six U.S. Mid-Atlantic states to adopt and implement a type of 
science policy innovation for wetland management. The sketches draw upon more than 90 
interviews with environmental bureaucrats and stakeholders in the region, as well as secondary-
source analysis and survey research. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This paper investigates how policy networks facilitate or inhibit the efforts of public 
bureaucracies to adopt and implement science policy innovations. Lubell and Fulton (2007); 
Balla (2001); True and Mintrom (2001), Young, Charns, and Shortell (2001); Mintrom and 
Vergari (1998); Lawton and Wholey (1993) and others suggest that such networks facilitate 
policy adoption. Pederson (2010), Tantivess and Walt (2008), Greenaway, Salter, and Hart 
(2007), Morris (2004), Hanf and O’Toole (1992) and others argue that they facilitate policy 
implementation. Nonetheless, how and why these networks facilitate these policy outcomes still 
requires greater exploration. This exploration should be grounded in theory and should provide 
tangible value to policy actors. This paper embarks on that theoretical grounding. 
Section 1 presents the paper’s propositions. Section 2 is devoted to theory. Section 3 
describes data collection and use. Section 4 presents case sketches. Section 5 discusses topics for 
future inquiry. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Written with support from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency STAR Fellowship FP-91708801. All content is 
entirely the responsibility of the author and not EPA. Per Indiana University and EPA institutional review board 
protocols, names of interviewees have in some cases been omitted. 
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1.1 Propositions 
 
1.1A)  When state bureaucrats have more numerous, weaker, and more permeable ties with 
critical actors, adoption of a science policy innovation is more likely. 
 
1.1B) When state bureaucrats have fewer, stronger, and less permeable ties with critical actors, 
implementation of a science policy innovation is more likely. 
 
1.1C) When network expansion-contraction and adoption-implementation cycles are (not) 
optimally aligned, adoption and implementation efforts are more likely to succeed (fail or stall). 
 
2.0 Theory 
 
2.1 Definitions 
 The types of public bureaucracies this paper discusses are state governmental agencies 
tasked with regulating activities affecting the environment. A state bureaucrat is an individual 
employed by such a public bureaucracy.  
 A science policy innovation is a policy affecting issues typically studied by scholars in 
the non-social sciences, e.g., chemistry or biology. The policy is new to the public bureaucracy 
adopting or implementing it, though it may have been adopted or implemented elsewhere 
(Walker 1969). A science policy innovation frequently is technically or scientifically complex. 
Policy actions concerning it frequently require application of technical or scientific expertise and 
data. The paper specifically examines rapid wetland assessment tools, products which state 
environmental bureaucrats can use to evaluate the functions and services wetlands provide. 
 Critical actors include scientists with expertise relevant to the science policy innovation, 
regional and national policy experts, and bureaucrats in other states. The boundaries delineating 
who is a critical actor are explained below.  
 A policy network is made up of at least two nodes, linkages, and a setting variable. While 
in theory nodes can be individuals, organizations, or any other type of entity, in this paper they 
are people and are usually referenced as “network members.”  
Policy network linkages are conduits for dependency relationships through which nodes 
exchange information, resources, or other goods (Benson 1982). Linkages tend to be stable and 
nonhierarchical (Borzel 1998). Networks form and persist because they are the most efficient, 
least risky, or least costly mechanisms available to help nodes to meet their needs (van Waarden 
1992).  
The setting variable is a substantive policy issue that both affects and is affected by the 
activities of the network (Borzel 1998). Policy networks develop among nodes with expert 
knowledge in the issue area and also often foster such knowledge. In this paper, the setting 
variable is rapid wetland assessment tool adoption and implementation.   
Network permeability is the ease with which a node can move in or out of the network. 
An entirely impermeable network would have compulsory and restricted membership. A highly 
permeable network would be characterized by entirely voluntary participation and no 
membership conditions (van Waarden 1992). Network permeability can refer to the network’s 
resistance to or acceptance of new ideas as well as new individuals (Carolan 2007). 
 The boundaries of a network, and thus its size, are determined by members’ perceptions; 
this is the “realist” approach to boundary drawing (Knoke and Yang 2008). Actors clearly 
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enmeshed in the policy network, in this case state wetland bureaucrats, are asked about their 
connections to other actors relevant to the substantive issue area. Someone is included the 
network when those core actors find that person’s inclusion reasonable (ibid.). The critical 
actors noted above are people included within the network boundaries but who are not state 
bureaucrats. 
“The strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie” (Granovetter 1973, 1316, emphasis added). Stronger ties tend to occur when 
linked actors spend more time with one another and share similar personal characteristics (ibid.). 
 Implementation of a science policy innovation is the innovation’s usage by state 
bureaucrats. Implementation is a continuous variable which can take values from 0, indicating no 
usage by anyone in a state bureaucracy, to 1, indicating usage by all bureaucrats in every 
situation to which the innovation is applicable. At intermediate values, only some bureaucrats 
might use the innovation, bureaucrats might use the innovation for some applications but not 
others, or bureaucrats might only use portions of the innovation.  
Implementation is an ongoing process. It begins when the first bureaucrat deploys the 
policy innovation, continues as the innovation experiences wider use, and reaches an apex where 
the innovation is wholly implemented by all relevant staff. Reaching this apex is not inevitable. 
Implementation may falter or decline at any point.  
Like implementation, adoption is not a binary variable, but rather a continuous one 
bounded by 0 and -1.2 Adoption begins when a state bureaucrat who has learned of a potentially 
relevant innovation takes an initial step toward potential, eventual implementation of that 
innovation by his or her state agency. The adoption process includes the range of preparatory 
activities that lead from that first step to the first actual usage of the innovation, i.e., to the start 
of implementation. A bureaucracy where no one has taken that first step takes a 0 on the 
adoption variable, a state where an innovation has seen its first usage takes a -1 (at this junction, 
adoption and implementation share a maximum and minimum), and at intermediate values, state 
bureaucrats have made varying degrees of progress towards implementation. The adoption path 
is neither inevitable nor necessarily smooth. 
 
2.1 How bureaucrats use policy networks in adoption and implementation of science policy 
innovations 
Bureaucrats can obtain resources or information from policy networks. This paper is 
mainly concerned with information and secondarily with human and political resources, viewing 
the latter primarily as the vehicles by which information is conveyed. Bureaucrats turn to other 
bureaucrats, scientists, and experts in the private and public sectors for policy-relevant 
information because, in today’s world of fast-paced information flows, bureaucracies rarely can 
generate independently all the information they need to make policy choices (Goldsmith and 
Eggers 2004). Bureaucrats rely on networks for data to inform science-based policies (Kerwin 
1994, May 1992) and for political and strategic information they could deploy to professional or 
personal advantage (Meier and Bohte 2007). Bureaucrats may use networks to find out how 
other government entities are behaving vis-à-vis various issues and thereby gain transferrable 
lessons (Heichel 2005, Mintrom 1997, Bennett and Howlett 1992). Bureaucrats may achieve 
policy goals by fostering supportive contacts and coalitions outside their agency (O’Leary 2004). 
                                                 
2
 The negative sign is required by the setup of the graphs used to illustrate the propositions, but has no other 
substantive meaning. 
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2.2 Policy network size, tie strength, and permeability are (imperfectly) correlated 
 A larger network usually has attenuated ties. As a group grows in size, members have 
more difficulty monitoring others’ behavior (Olson 1965). Even in active networks where 
interactions are frequent, increasing network size increases the number of engagement options 
available to any one member and thus may reduce the frequency with which any two members 
interact.  
 When members have fewer repeated interactions, they may perceive the network as less 
cohesive and their connections to the network, and it to them, less consequential. They may be 
less interested in or able to learn the logics of appropriateness (March and Olsen 2004) and 
shared norms and beliefs that might otherwise guide their behavior as network members. Inter-
member linkages in a larger network generally will be weaker than ties in a smaller network. 
 A large network reached its size by accepting members; at least at some point, it was 
relatively permeable. Permeability facilitates the introduction into the network of new 
perspectives from new members. Indeed, Reagans and McEvily (2003) show that members of 
networks with larger ranges, a concept closely related to network size, tend to be better at 
obtaining and transferring complex ideas. These new insights can further weaken network ties by 
revealing potentially divisive dissimilarities among members (see Heider 1958). Weak ties 
further encourage permeability of actors and ideas. Whereas members of tight-knit, highly 
internally socialized networks may share cognitive filters which screen out information that 
contradicts dominant policy narratives (Sabatier and Weible 2007), members of more permeable 
networks may have fewer such compunctions. In summary, larger networks appear likely to be 
relatively permeable and characterized by weak ties. 
 A smaller network’s members are likely to interact with the same members more 
frequently than in a larger network. Iterated interactions create common expectations about how 
people will behave and the norms to which they adhere (Ferejohn 2003, Elster 1986). Coleman 
(1988) described networks which foster shared norms as achieving “closure,” noting that these 
tend to be strong-tie networks. Intuitively, networks composed primarily of strong ties are likely 
to be smaller than those composed of weak ties because the investments of time and human 
capital required to forge strong ties often prevents actors from establishing as many such 
relationships.  
 Pinto (2006) argues that a low-permeability network is usually composed of strong ties, 
whereas a high-permeability network is more likely to have weaker ties. A network that is more 
permeable may have a membership characterized by shorter rather than longer tenures and 
greater tenure heterogeneity. Brown (2006) links time individuals spend within an organization 
to their development of collective identities that begin to meld members’ narratives and 
worldviews. Individuals must spend time together to begin to perceive the logics of 
appropriateness and norms that apply to their actions as members of the group (March and Olsen 
2004, van Maanen and Schein 1977). A low-permeability network thus is likely to be cohesive 
with strong ties, and stronger-tie networks appear more likely to be small than large.  
 The correlations between network size, strength of ties, and permeability are imperfect. A 
large network can be relatively impermeable if its membership rarely changes and its substantive 
focus is narrow and static. A small network can have weak ties if members interact infrequently, 
while a large network can have strong ties if its members interact quite frequently. This paper’s 
argument simply is that the correlations described above are more likely than other combinations 
of permeability, size, and tie strength. 
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Other variables, such as time, can affect correlation strength and direction. For example, 
the argument that a large network must be permeable because it accepted many members is most 
tenable if the network just formed and added those individuals. If the network is mature, its 
current level of permeability may be different than its initial level. Similarly, arguing that 
heterogeneity among network members creates weak ties is most tenable if the network is new 
and members have just discovered the dissimilarities that make close relationships appear 
implausible. If members have worked in the same policy arena for a long time, their 
dissimilarities may become less important than shared norms fostered during their iterated 
interactions.  
This paper assumes that the networks it describes can be observed from formation 
onwards, and that none are too temporally distant from that point. For states considering 
adopting and implementing wetland assessment tools, this assumption is plausible. Few states 
began to consider using such tools until the mid-1990s (Poeske 2010); policy networks 
concerned with wetland assessment and centered around state bureaucrats often can be traced to 
that era. However, the impact of time on this paper’s propositions must be explored further.  
 
2.3 Policy networks experience cycles of greater or lesser permeability and tie strength and 
smaller and larger size  
 A policy network may start out small and grow larger as members work to bring more 
people with more relevant expertise into the group. Or, people might push their way into the 
network upon realizing its existence and its relevance to them, as members of a neighborhood 
affected by a toxic substances leak might insist on being represented at relevant governmental 
discussions. Once the leak is addressed, however, the network may shrink as community 
stakeholders leave. A network of individuals who pick up litter in a community park may begin 
as a loose collectivity of occasional volunteers; those weak ties might grow strong if a tornado 
wreaks havoc on the town and the group pulls together to rehabilitate area green spaces. Network 
permeability, size, and tie strength are not constant. The variables change through two main 
mechanisms.   
 First, the settings of these variables may be manipulated by policy entrepreneurs or 
stakeholders. Policy entrepreneurs advantageously couple politics, policies, and problems to 
effect political change (Kingdon 1984). Entrepreneurs can negotiate between policy coalitions 
with competing preferences (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007). A 
policy entrepreneur acts on behalf of some organization or public, inchoate or not, and receives 
some benefit in return; the benefit is likely intangible rather than monetary (Kuhnert 2001). 
  Knoke and Yang (1996) called for more research into the ways policy entrepreneurs can 
exert strategic influence in policy networks. Mintrom and Vergari (1998) find that when policy 
entrepreneurs leverage their involvement in networks, they are more likely to accomplish their 
goals of legislative reform. Greenaway, Salter, and Hart (2007) show that policy entrepreneurs 
involved in hospital siting decision can manipulate the nature and foci of implementation 
networks. Christopoulos (2006, 757) even argues that networks “provide the context within 
which these actors thrive” and that “political entrepreneurs are network-dependent [which] 
implies that their ability for political action is network-contingent.” 
 A stakeholder is a particular type of policy entrepreneur. The stakeholder often is not 
involved in the policy network because of an intentional, professional interest. Rather, he found 
himself affected by the substantive activities of the network and wanted to participate in the 
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choices impacting him. He can push and pull at the network’s setting variables in the same way 
as a policy entrepreneur, but his motivations and perspectives often are different. 
 The second way in which network variable settings can be changed is through the 
influence of events beyond the scope of the network. In Ostrom’s (2005) Institutional Analysis 
and Design (IAD) framework, events occurring in the action situation – the focal unit of the 
analysis, and in this case, the arena wherein the policy network is operating – are affected by 
larger forces: attributes of the physical world, the community context, and rules and institutional 
arrangements. These forces clearly can affect a policy network focused on a science policy 
innovation. If the relevant science changes (attribute of the physical world), this will affect the 
nature and activities of the network. If the innovation is adopted or implemented by other states 
(community context), this action and its outcomes will impact the policy network. If the state 
legislature passes a new law in the network’s substantive area (rule/institutional arrangement), 
the network may become very active because there will be demand for science policy 
innovations to help implement legislation.  
 The ways in which policy network size, permeability, and tie strength change due to 
manipulation or external forces can be described visually: 
 
Figure 1 
 
 A network does not always expand (increasing in size and permeability and ties 
weakening due to attenuation), reach an apex, and then contract (decreasing in size and 
permeability, with ties growing stronger) or vice-versa. These cycles are not inevitable. 
However, when external forces or internal manipulators try to create change in a policy network, 
these are the paths along which those modifications frequently occur.  
 
2.3 Adoption and implementation processes experience similar cycles 
 The adaptive management literature assumes that adoption and implementation are 
cyclically linked. In the classic model, a policy is adopted and then implemented. Its results are 
assessed and the policy is revised based on lessons learned. The revised policy is then adopted 
and implemented, its results are assessed, and the process iterates (Lee 1999, McLain and Lee 
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1996). Weimer and Vining’s (2005) claim that policy implementation can be understood as a 
series of adoptions is consistent with this perspective, as is the argument of this paper that both 
adoption and implementation are continuous variables representing processes. The cyclical 
nature of adoption and implementation can be described visually:3 
 
Figure 2 
 
 Adoption and implementation processes do not spontaneously flow from one parabola to 
the other. A state bureaucracy may move along these curves via manipulation by policy 
entrepreneurs, who may be bureaucrats or stakeholders. Literature supports the argument that 
such entrepreneurs facilitate policy adoption (e.g., Hays and Glick 1997, Mintrom 1997, Balla 
2001, Shipan and Volden 2006) and implementation (e.g., Bardach 1977; Levin and Ferman 
1986; Nakamura, Church, and Cooper 1991; Oliver and Paul-Sheehan 1997). Or, a bureaucracy 
may be propelled along the curves by external forces that can be captured by Ostrom’s three 
categories. For example, if the community in which a bureaucracy seeks to implement a science 
policy innovation is skeptical of it (community context), implementation may stall. If an event in 
the biophysical world makes the science policy innovation immediately necessary (such as a 
flood making more vital a wetland assessment tool that could evaluate wetland flood storage), 
the bureaucracy likely will be spurred along the adoption path. If local zoning boards adopt 
ordinances (rules/institutional arrangements) that call for use of an innovation  that is different 
from the one the bureaucracy was in the process of adopting, adoption may stall or be delayed.  
 
2.4 Larger, more permeable, and weaker-tie networks facilitate adoption 
 Weak ties can serve as bridges among dissimilar individuals (Granovetter 1973, Burt 
2001). Because of their diversity, these individuals are likely to bring a wider variety of 
resources and perspectives to the action situation than a group of more similar individuals. Policy 
adoption frequently requires coalition building (Burstein 1991) that weak ties facilitate. 
 The likelihood that an innovation will be adopted is in part a function of resources 
available to help those pushing the innovation overcome obstacles (Mohr 1969). A large policy 
                                                 
3
 The captions in Figure 2 refer to a rapid wetland assessment tool specifically but can describe a science policy 
innovation generally. 
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network has a large number of members who can bring information and resources to the task of 
surmounting organizational inertia and overcoming adoption-related resistance that may exist 
inside and outside the bureaucracy.   
 Relatedly, larger networks may be better than smaller networks at searching out 
adoption-facilitative information. Oliver and Marwell (1988) theorize that, although collective 
action (such as the acquisition of information that would help improve a science policy 
innovation and pave the way for implementation) is generally considered more difficult with 
larger groups, when the costs of a collective good such as information are relatively invariant, 
larger groups should be more successful in its acquisition because they “have more resources and 
are more likely to have a critical mass of highly interested and resourceful actors” (ibid.,1). And, 
indeed, the costs of seeking relevant information do not grow with network size. The amount of 
potentially relevant information available in the external world is unaffected by the number of 
policy network members looking for it. In fact, search costs actually decline as the network 
grows because costs are distributed among more searchers.  
 Members of a relatively permeable network often have less group cohesion than those in 
less permeable ones, thanks to fewer interactions and reduced ability to observe and monitor 
others. This disconnect limits Sabatier’s (1978) “devil shift” or Janis’s (1971) “groupthink.” 
Both are phenomena that cause tight-knit groups to close ranks on ideas and discount or reject 
potentially more useful ones simply because they are different or not supplied by group 
members. Thus, a more permeable network more easily accepts new perspectives. Those new 
insights are valuable when bureaucrats are considering which science policy innovation to adopt 
and how to tailor an innovation to the state’s needs; making smart choices about a relatively 
unknown quantity often requires previously unknown data. 
 
2.5 Smaller, less permeable, and stronger-tie networks facilitate implementation 
 A network with fewer members can focus on pushing implementation forward because, 
relative to a larger network, its members have to spend less energy and resources managing intra-
group coalitions and competing interests. Even if not all members of the network agree that on 
the advisability of implementing the innovation, when the network is smaller there will be fewer 
members whose disagreements could stall implementation. Changing the preferences and 
patterns of interactions among policy-relevant actors is one of the biggest challenges of policy 
implementation (Crosby 1996); networks which can do this more easily are more likely to 
experience successful implementation outcomes.   
 Because smaller, less permeable networks have more opportunity to build group 
cohesion, their members may be affected by Sabatier’s “devil shift” or Janis’s “groupthink.” 
Members are more likely to close ranks on the innovation that has been adopted, devoting 
themselves to its success and discounting information that might distract them. This narrow 
focus is a double-edged sword, however. It might do a disservice to the innovation itself, since a 
relatively blinkered group of adherents could ignore data pointing to better innovations or more 
productive implementation modes. To the extent that flaws in the adopted innovation are not 
apparent or sufficiently salient to members of the policy network, and yet are fundamental 
enough to cause implementation problems, a smaller, more cohesive network could be a liability 
instead of an asset. It is likely there is some ceiling on the amount of network member buy-in 
that is facilitative. 
 Networks with strong ties that build cooperation and trust accumulate “bonding” social 
capital, in contrast to the “bridging” social capital associated with weak ties (Gittell and Vidal 
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1998). Bonding social capital strengthens existing in-network relationships. Intensification of 
these linkages is important because it fortifies members to face an implementation process 
inevitably fraught with challenges (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). 
 
2.6 The Goldilocks dilemma 
 In an ideal world, a policy network best positioned to facilitate adoption of a science 
policy innovation would have ties weak enough to facilitate the formation of bridging social 
capital, allowing network members to form vital coalitions and infusing the adoption process 
with the diversity of information and resources necessary to select, refine, and tailor a highly 
technical science policy innovation, yet not so weak that members’ limited commitment would 
lead them to participate in network functions infrequently and fail to bring resources to the 
network because its activities would not be sufficiently salient to them. The network would be 
large enough to bring in the volume and diversity of information necessary to facilitate adoption 
and minimize search costs through distribution, but not so large that members’ sense of 
disconnect from the network would cause them to shirk. The network would have enough 
permeability to accept the new members and ideas important for refining the innovation in 
preparation for adoption, but would not be so permeable that members’ short tenures would 
inhibit follow-through or that the quantity and diversity of ideas introduced would be so large as 
to overwhelm. 
 Similarly, a policy network best positioned to facilitate implementation of a science 
policy innovation would be small enough to minimize the amount of time network members 
spend on intra-group “cat herding,” but not so small that it leaves out individuals with 
substantive expertise and interests whose exclusion could cause subsequent implementation 
problems in the form of unresolved objections or intransigent preferences and patterns of 
interaction. The network would have enough group cohesion to foster buy-in, but not enough to 
cause willful blindness. The network would have enough bonding social capital that members 
would be confident in and committed to the innovation despite the challenges of implementation, 
but not so much that, in the face of such challenges, they would be slavishly inflexible about the 
implementation process or even some aspects of the innovation itself. 
 Identifying one “correct” network size, level of permeability, and strength of ties is 
impossible. The optimal values for these variables will depend on characteristics of the 
innovation; policy network composition; the relevant organizational, political, and 
socioeconomic contexts; the history of the policy network; and other factors. Although it is not 
possible to find the point at which each variable’s setting is “just right,” it should be possible to 
make predictions about the conditions under which different the configurations might be more or 
less facilitative of adoption or implementation (see Ostrom 2007). 
 
2.7 The ideal relationship between network expansion-contraction (EC) and adoption-
implementation (AI) cycles 
 Figure 3 is a visual depiction of the claims in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 concerning the 
network variable settings that facilitate adoption and implementation of a science policy 
innovation: 
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Figure 3 
 
 The blue curve is the parabolas from Figure 1 connected so they intersect the x-axis, 
which for this curve represents some baseline levels of the network variables. The gray curve is 
the parabolas from Figure 2 connected so they intersect the x-axis, which for the gray curve 
represents (from left to right) the zero-point where adoption has not yet been initiated, the point 
where adoption is complete and implementation begins, and the point where implementation 
stops and the stage is set for adoption of a new innovation or a revised version of the original 
innovation. Adoption is best facilitated when the blue curve is at its maximum and 
implementation is best facilitated when the blue curve is at its minimum. 
Time on the x-axis suggests that the curves show how quickly or slowly the AI or EC 
cycles occur. While the curves in Figure 3 ideal sine waves, in real life the curves may be steeper 
or flatter and are unlikely to be symmetric or perfectly 180 degrees of out of phase. 
Two y-axes could be added. The first could have units corresponding to the magnitude of 
network change; the height of the EC curves then would indicate the degree to which the 
correlated network variables moved from some baseline. The y-axis for the AI curves would 
mark off intervals between the maximum (1 or -1) and minimum (0) for adoption and 
implementation. There may be other conceptual issues associated with adding y-axes; this paper 
does not explore them. 
Adoption and implementation and network expansion and contraction are conceptualized 
as sequential processes, both for the sake of simplicity and because, in the real world, they often 
are. However, there is another potentially ideal alignment of AI and EC curves. This scenario 
may better approximate reality in some cases, but because it is more complex, it is not 
considered beyond its explication here. 
The second ideal alignment recognizes that people often multi-task. Policy network 
members are simultaneously involved in separate implementation and adoption processes. The 
network splits, with a small group devoting itself to implementation while the larger group 
focuses on adoption; overlaps in group membership are possible: 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
This scenario would occur when policy network members pursue adaptive management 
in its ideal form. Preparation for adoption and implementation of the next iteration of a science 
policy innovation begins immediately upon implementation of the first iteration. As soon as the 
innovation is fully implemented (1.0 on the implementation parabola in Figure 1), network 
members can begin to observe and assess the its impacts. The 1.0 value then aligns with the 
decision point indicated in the adoption parabola in Figure 2. Network members now can make 
an evidence-based choice about the nature of the innovation in the next iteration. The troughs in 
Figure 4 are wider and flatter, indicating that at this point of alignment, there is less change in the 
extent of implementation, adoption, expansion, or contraction; relevant actors are pausing to see 
how implementation plays out and thus what adoption choices should be made. Then, almost as 
soon as implementation of the original innovation stops – with another flat portion of the curves 
representing potential delays or hitches associated with the change-over – implementation of the 
revised version of the innovation can begin. The adoption process delivers the next iteration just 
in time.  
Section 4 shows how various kinds of alignment failures can cause implementation and 
adoption problems. Alignment and misalignment also are critical in this more complex picture. 
 
2.8 Causality 
 This paper’s propositions assume that network permeability, size, and tie strength are 
independent variables that affect the likelihood and nature of adoption and implementation. 
However, members of policy networks work with each other over time and on different tasks in 
their shared issue area. They may be involved in multiple adoption and implementation efforts. 
 When interactions are iterated, the outcomes of policy-related choices become the inputs 
into new interaction and decision processes (Ostrom 2005). Particularly given the complex, 
dynamic nature of the systems explored here, path dependencies – situations where initial 
choices have disproportionate influence over options subsequently available to decision-makers, 
and the direction and magnitude of outcomes may be unpredictable and not commensurate with 
inputs (Pierson 2000) – are likely. Path dependencies could create situations where, in later 
iterations, the dependent variables affect the independent variables. For example, a policy 
network may be small because its membership consolidated to facilitate implementation. 
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However, when that network next wants to adopt an innovation, it will be challenged by its lack 
of members. The implementation experience at time one affects network size at time two. Thus, 
the relationships described here are most realistically understood as correlations.  
 
3.0 Methods 
 The goals of the empirical portion of this inquiry are to: 
 
1) Describe the rapid wetland assessment tool adoption and implementation processes that have 
occurred in Mid-Atlantic states since 1995; 
 
2) Quantify the size, permeability, and strength of ties in the wetland assessment policy networks 
that existed when the adoption and implementation processes were occurring; and 
 
3) Trace the adoption-implementation and network expansion-contraction cycles and evaluate 
the extent to which they correspond with the theoretical propositions in Section 1.1. 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
3.11 Interviews 
 More than 90 individuals in six states – Delaware, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and West Virginia – were interviewed between September 2010 and April 2011 
concerning adoption and implementation of rapid wetland assessment tools for regulatory 
purposes in the states. The interviewees were state bureaucrats directly involved in wetland 
regulation; federal wetland regulators from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; state, regional, and national wetland scientists and policy 
experts; and environmental consultants who regularly worked in the six states.  
 Interviewees were initially selected because of their membership in an EPA-funded 
regional workgroup devoted to advancing the science and policy of wetland assessment; because 
their names were located on current and past state bureaucracy organizational charts, guidance 
documents, permit files, published versions of rapid wetland assessment tools, and other 
secondary sources; or because they were recommended by EPA wetland regulators. Subsequent 
interviewees were selected because they were mentioned by initial interviewees. 
 The interviews were semi-structured. One line of questioning inquired about the 
interviewee’s network ties. State bureaucrats were asked about who they relied upon for 
assistance or advice when implementing a rapid wetland assessment tool or during the adoption 
process. They were specifically asked about their relationships with academics, members of the 
regional wetland workgroup, and other policy experts. Scientists and policy experts, federal 
regulators, and consultants were asked about the nature of their relationships with state wetland 
bureaucrats. Federal regulators also were asked how they would describe the bureaucrats’ 
relationships with other sources of wetland assessment expertise. Consultants were asked about 
their overall perceptions of the functioning of the state wetland bureaucracy, especially in 
comparison to other states in which the consultants had worked. As of May 31, all but eight 
interviews were transcribed, but only one was coded.  
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3.12 Surveys 
 Two mixed-method surveys were launched between February and May 2011. The first 
survey was administered to a sample of individuals whose names have been associated, in 
published reports or anecdotal references, with tools whose use was reported in any of the states. 
These were individuals who, if state bureaucrats communicated with them, likely were members 
of those bureaucrats’ wetland assessment policy networks. The sampling strategy was exhaustive 
in its aim rather than based on probability.   
The goal of this survey was to explore the relationships between this group of potential 
critical actors and the state bureaucrats who may or may not have adopted and implemented their 
tools. Eligible respondents were asked multiple choice questions about how frequently they 
initiated contact with state bureaucrats to provide tool adoption or implementation assistance and 
how frequently state bureaucrats initiated communication with them. Respondents were asked 
about what they generally discussed when they communicated with state bureaucrats. Finally, 
respondents were asked multiple choice questions about how helpful bureaucrats in each state 
seemed to have found the respondent’s tool. 
  Sample members were invited to the online survey via email or postal mail. Email 
addresses were obtained from online or print secondary sources. Postal mailing addresses were 
obtained using free and fee online people search engines. Sample members had approximately 
1.5 months to complete the survey. Members contacted via email received two reminders, while 
members contacted via postal mail received one. The sample frame contained some individuals 
to whom the survey did not apply (for example, a postal recipient who had the same name as an 
assessment tool developer). The first question in the survey screened out ineligible individuals. 
At the end of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate the names of other assessment tool 
developers to whom the survey would apply. This question allowed a second round of email and 
mail surveying.  
 The survey cooperation rate, calculated using as the denominator an estimate of “the 
proportion of all cases interviewed of all eligible units ever contacted” (AAPOR 2011, 6), was 
52.13%. This value is an estimate because the proportional allocation method (Smith 2009), the 
strategy for estimating unknown eligibility used by the American Association for Public Opinion 
Research’s online response rate calculator, was used to approximate the number of ineligible cases 
among non-respondents. This estimation procedure was selected because it tends to be conservative 
(Smith 2009). The data from the first survey have not been analyzed further.  
 The second survey was administered via email and postal mail to individuals in the six states. 
The sample aimed to include all current or former state employees who at some point since 1995 
worked in divisions or departments that engaged in wetland assessment for regulatory purposes.  
 The survey asked respondents to indicate up to four individuals upon whom they relied 
the most, in their professional capacity, for advice about wetland regulatory matters at some 
point since 1995. This is an approach commonly used in social science network research 
(Carrington, Scott, and Wasserman 2005). The respondent is the “ego” and each contact she 
reports is an “alter.”  
Egos were asked about the duration of their relationships with each alter. The duration 
questions were intended to access a dimension of network permeability; if relationships were 
generally long-lasting, the network may be relatively impermeable, and vice-versa. Egos also 
responded to multiple choice questions about nature of their relationships with each alter and the 
frequency of the interactions, measures intended to access tie strength.  
 Names of potential respondents were collected from secondary sources such as old permit 
files, regulatory letters, resource monitoring reports, and staff directories. EPA wetland 
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regulators and current state employees contacted for interviews also provided contacts. Email 
addresses were obtained when possible from online and print sources. Postal addresses were 
located using the process described for the first survey. Postal recipients were invited to the same 
online survey as email recipients. The survey had an initial a screening question meant to ensure 
that only individuals who used or could have used rapid wetland assessment tools for a 
regulatory purpose were queried. Sample members had approximately one month to complete 
the survey. Members contacted via email received two reminders, while members contacted via 
postal mail received one. At the time of this writing, the last state survey deadline had just 
passed. The data are not yet analyzed.  
 
3.13 Quasi-ethnographic research 
 Over the periods May-August 2008, 2009, and 2010, the author was a National Network 
of Environmental Management Scholars fellow at the EPA regional office responsible for federal 
wetland regulatory activities in five of the six states in the sample. From August 2010 through 
May 2011, the author was a volunteer at that same office. EPA regional wetland regulators spend 
a significant portion of their time working with their state wetland regulatory counterparts. 
Working with the EPA staff offered much insight on wetland regulation in the Mid-Atlantic 
states and unique access to data.  
 
3.14 Secondary source research 
 The author was given access by EPA staff to all the documents that the regional 
workgroup on wetland science and policy has produced since its inception in the early 2000s and 
at least three years’ worth of reports and budgets associated with wetland program development 
grants that have flowed from EPA to the Mid-Atlantic states. The author independently gathered 
other reports, tool copies, presentations, meeting minutes, and other relevant documents. As of 
this writing these data have not been coded.  
  
3.2 Operationalizing key variables 
 This section describes the how key variables will be constructed for analysis. These 
approaches likely will be refined.  
 Network size will be measured by recording the names of individuals mentioned in 
interviews and survey data and noted in secondary sources concerning wetland assessment in a 
given state. The number of these individuals will represent network size.  
 Network permeability will be measured in part by reviewing the lists of member names 
and counting the number of members who appear to have entered the network after the 1995 
baseline. Entrance into the network will be indicated by the individual’s first appearance in 
secondary source or by interviewee comments on the timing of an individual’s network entrance.  
To this count will be added the number of individuals who appear to have left the 
network. This number is more difficult to estimate from secondary sources because absence of 
mention does not definitively indicate that a member has left. Thus, exits from the network will 
primarily be gleaned from instances when interviewees mention that someone stopped being 
involved in wetland assessment activities. The number of exits and entrances will be added; a 
higher score will indicate more permeability. 
The permeability score may be adjusted up or down using two multipliers. First, the 
average duration of a bureaucrat-critical actor linkage, as indicated by the survey data, will be 
calculated and compared to the durations associated with other states in the sample. The duration 
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values will be separated into low, medium, and high categories. These values will be assigned 
multipliers such that a low value increases the permeability score, a medium value keeps it 
constant, and a high value reduces it. Second, the permeability of the network to new ideas will 
be categorized as low, medium, or high depending on the author’s qualitative impressions 
gleaned from interviews, and the values assigned multipliers that adjust the permeability score. 
 Tie strength will be measured primarily using survey data. Survey respondents were 
asked to use ordinal categories to report the frequency of their interaction with critical actors. 
The average proportion of interactions that fell into each category will be calculated for each 
network. Bureaucrats were asked to categorize the critical actors to whom they were connected 
as professional acquaintances, colleagues, or friends. The average proportion of linkages that fell 
into each category will also be calculated for each network. The policy networks will be 
compared vis-à-vis their distributions on these variables and ranked according to evidence of tie 
strength.  
 Adoption and implementation will be continuous variables bounded by 0 and +/-1. The 
thresholds that will determine the location of a state bureaucracy on the AI curves are 
substantive, such as the first instance of tool pilot testing or a specific percentage of state 
bureaucrats estimated to be using the tool. In the interest of space, the thresholds are not 
described here. Evidence supporting the placement of a state bureaucracy on the AI curves will 
come from interviews, survey data, and secondary sources. 
 
4.0 Case Sketches 
Since the data remain largely unanalyzed, the vignettes below are not full case studies. 
They rely on a limited number of interviews and secondary sources and not at all on the survey 
data. They are meant to illustrate how alignment or misalignment of the AI and EC cycles 
appears to facilitate or hinder the adoption and implementation of a science policy innovation. 
Each sketch is followed by a visual depiction of the dynamics the sketch explored.  
  
4.1 Delaware 
 Delaware is in the middle stages of adopting a rapid wetland assessment tool for 
regulatory purposes, having recently passed the decision point where bureaucrats commit to such 
use. In 2009, the watershed assessment section of the Delaware Department of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Control secured EPA funds to adapt for regulatory use the rapid 
wetland assessment tool that has been used in Delaware for restoration and conservation 
purposes since 2001 (Biddle, Jacobs, and Herr 2009).  
 Unlike in the other states, the policy network surrounding wetland assessment in 
Delaware developed around a tool designed, revised, and used over many years for non-
regulatory purposes. The Delaware Rapid Assessment Protocol (DERAP) is well known to 
wetland assessment experts regionally and nationally. Practically every person interviewed for 
this project who was familiar with both wetland assessment and the states in question mentioned 
DERAP, usually citing it as an example of a sophisticated, scientifically rigorous tool. One 
federal wetland expert said that no study of wetland assessment in the region would be complete 
without an examination of Delaware and DERAP, and that Delaware is a “poster child” for 
wetland assessment (Rhodes 2010). Aspects of the tool have been recently analyzed or profiled 
in national scholarly journals such as Wetlands (Sifneos et al. 2010) and Environmental 
Management (Herlihy et al. 2009).  
Arnold 4th Annual Conference on Political Networks 16 
 
 As DERAP has developed and become nationally known, the bureaucrats responsible for 
it have collected a large and diverse (weak tie) network of scientists and policy experts interested 
in using, helping refine, or studying the tool. This network was accessible to Delaware’s wetland 
bureaucrats as they moved to the adoption decision point and arguably facilitated that movement.  
The question now is whether Delaware’s policy network will be able to contract, 
becoming stronger and less permeable to facilitate implementation. There is evidence that this 
contraction may be delayed because of external influences of the types noted in Sections 2.3 and 
2.4. A state wetland bureaucrat who has long been crucial to the assessment effort in Delaware 
recently left state government. The reshuffling of this individual’s responsibilities and intra-
agency regrouping seems to be causing general delays in the state’s wetland regulatory efforts. 
For example, a project manager on the grant cited above recently pushed back by multiple 
months a check-in meeting with EPA staff, explaining that there was just no time. Also, in the 
summer of 2010, DERAP started experiencing heavy and often critical scrutiny by federal 
regulators. A developer attempted to use the tool to assess a wetland area in Delaware in 
preparation for a controversial project. Federal regulators’ objections to the project seem to have 
negatively affected the way some of them perceive the tool. In part because of the 
interrelationships between state and federal wetland regulatory processes, it is helpful to state 
regulators when federal regulators approve of the former’s work. Delaware’s wetland regulators 
thus may be waiting for the DERAP issue to “cool off” before they attempt a push towards 
implementation of the tool in regulatory applications. 
 
Figure 5 
 
4.2 Maryland 
 From 1970 to roughly the early 1990s, Maryland was one of the nation’s leading states 
vis-à-vis wetland protection and innovative tools for that purpose (Rhodes 2010); one retired 
state regulator stated that Maryland “had one of the most progressive wetland programs in the 
world.” The state passed tidal wetland protection legislation in 1970 and a non-tidal wetlands 
protection act in 1989 (Gaddie and Regens 2000). Multiple interviewees noted that in the 1970s, 
1980s, and early 1990s, Maryland’s wetland regulators, particularly its program leaders, were 
well-connected to a variety of national, regional, and local critical contacts. Ties with a highly 
supportive governor, for example, facilitated the passage of the non-tidal legislation (ibid.). 
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 Today, however, Maryland’s policy network devoted to innovations in wetland policy 
has changed. Minutes and attendance sheets from the Mid-Atlantic Wetland Work Group 
(MAWWG), the regional group devoted to advancing wetland assessment science and policy, 
suggest that there has been minimal turnover among the Maryland’s assessment staff since 
MAWWG’s inception in the early 2000s. The same individual has been responsible for the 
regulatory wetland assessment effort in the state since the mid-1990s; one interviewee said that 
this individual has “been there since the beginning of time.” The policy network’s current small 
size appears the result of a persistent failure to bridge a major structural hole, suggesting a 
dominance of bonding over bridging social capital and also limited permeability. More than one 
interviewee reported a history of non-cooperation between the state’s regulatory environmental 
agency and its natural resource management agency. While both agencies pursue wetland-related 
activities, they pursue them largely in separate spheres. 
 The number of state staffers involved in regulatory-targeted wetland assessment in 
Maryland appears small relative to the number in the other states. One EPA expert called the 
state’s assessment program fairly “insulated.” Unlike in a state such as Ohio, where the state-
specific technical workgroup devoted to assessment involved a variety of actors with different 
affiliations, Maryland’s wetland assessment workgroup is almost entirely composed staff from 
state agencies (ELI 2008). When state bureaucrats tapped a public sector environmental think 
tank to help strategize about wetland assessment tool development, the expert with whom state 
staffers worked most closely was regarded by some EPA experts as “behind the times.”  
 It appears that, over time, Maryland’s policy network associated with innovations in 
wetland management shrank, becoming more ossified and less permeable. While this contraction 
probably facilitated the implementation of wetland innovations adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, 
it left Maryland less able to adopt new wetland innovations. Today, Maryland has begun the tool 
adoption process, but only barely. 
In the mid-1990s the state failed in a major bid to adopt a high-profile wetland policy 
innovation: state assumption of the federal wetland permitting program (Gaddie and Regens 
2000). Since then, Maryland has appeared largely to be “resting on its laurels” instead of keeping 
up with the latest wetland policy innovations (Rhodes 2010). Maryland’s current assessment 
program has been described by some regional experts as “dead in the water” and “a fairly tragic 
story.” Since the early 2000s, the state has received EPA funds to develop a rapid wetland 
assessment tool. It has used these funds to develop a series of monitoring plans, convene a state 
workgroup on wetland assessment, and commission external research entities to produce papers 
on assessment (Clearwater 2010). Maryland remains the only state in the region that has neither 
recently developed a rapid wetland assessment tool nor is considering adopting or implementing 
a specific one. Some EPA staff members report being frustrated with the way Maryland has used 
its grant monies and its lack of assessment tool progress. But Maryland’s limited progress on 
adoption or implementation of a rapid wetland assessment tool makes theoretical sense; its 
policy network is the opposite of the type of network which appears to facilitate adoption. 
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Figure 6 
 
4.3 Ohio 
 All the states have one or more intra-state technical workgroups devoted to wetland 
assessment issues. Members of these groups are almost certainly members of the states’ policy 
networks surrounding wetland policy innovation. The Ohio workgroup, formed in the late 1990s, 
appears to have been most diverse and perhaps the largest among all the intra-state groups. This 
network consisted of roughly 20 people, and it grew out of a larger stakeholder group of 50–80 
people (Mack 2010). The Ohio workgroup comprised scientists, members of environmental 
advocacy groups, representatives of the regulated community, and state bureaucrats from a 
variety of agencies. A scientist led the group’s effort to find a workable assessment approach. 
The group extensively reviewed the scientific and gray literatures about assessment around the 
country, then decided that rapid wetland assessment tools already in use in two different states, 
Minnesota and Washington, would provide the best basis for Ohio’s assessment effort (Fennessy 
2010).  
Presumably learning about assessment tools around the country, and obtaining 
assessment tools from Minnesota and Washington and learning how to use them, required 
members of the Ohio policy network to forge ties with bureaucrats and critical actors in other 
states. These likely were weak ties, which are best suited for conveying information and less 
suited for fostering close personal relationships (Granovetter 1973). Not only was the network 
that facilitated tool adoption large and characterized by weak ties, but it also clearly was 
permeable to new ideas.  
 This diverse technical workgroup facilitated the creation of the Ohio Rapid Wetland 
Assessment Method (ORAM) in 1998, then helped the state revise the tool five times between 
1998 and 2001. Over that time period, the tool actually was being implemented while new 
iterations were being developed; this situation most closely parallels the more complex optimal 
alignment scenario described by Figure 4. Bureaucrats involved with implementation at that time 
report that their interactions with members of the policy network were regular, ongoing, and 
relatively intense (Mack 2010). On the other hand, the larger network of critical actors devoted 
to adoption was still conferring and drawing on a variety of sources to help improve the tool in 
its next iteration (Fennessy 2010). Thus, the small, less permeable, and stronger-tie network 
facilitative of implementation coexisted for a time with the larger, more permeable, and weaker-
tie network facilitative of adoption. 
 ORAM was not revised after 2001. Legislative changes made revisions more difficult, 
though not impossible, and most members of the policy network agreed that the tool was in good 
shape (Micacchion 2010). The large network devoted to adoption mostly dissipated, leaving a 
small cadre of individuals who now do research and analysis in support of the ongoing, complete 
integration of ORAM into Ohio’s wetland regulatory program. Today, all state wetland 
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regulators must be familiar with ORAM and state wetland permit applicants have strong formal 
and informal incentives to use it (Mack 2010). The tool has become fully part of the state’s 
wetland regulatory culture (ibid.) and is generally perceived by members of the wetland policy 
community as a major assessment success story. 
 
Figure 7 
 
4.4 Pennsylvania 
 In the mid- to late-1990s, Pennsylvania committed to developing a wetland assessment 
tool. It was supported in this effort by the Pennsylvania State Cooperative Wetlands Center, early 
participation in MAWWG, and an active intra-state assessment workgroup that brought together 
staff from the departments of environmental protection and natural resources, the fish and boat 
commission, the state transportation agency, and the game commission, as well as various 
members of the public and the private sectors. The Wetlands Protection Advisory Committee 
(WETPAC) met every three to four months. Led by a bureaucrat strongly committed to 
assessment, the group appeared to have been making good progress toward developing a tool 
that ultimately could be implemented. The policy network was relatively large, diverse, and 
apparently permeable. 
 However, larger political trends in the state as well as staffing changes at the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) caused the network to begin to 
disintegrate in the early 2000s. Interviewees who used to participate in WETPAC activities said 
that meetings just tapered off, and that they stopped being called by PADEP bureaucrats seeking 
input about assessment. Importantly, this network disruption occurred before the group had 
reached final consensus on the nature of the tool. Adoption was still ostensibly in progress. 
 Today, the policy network surrounding wetland assessment in Pennsylvania appears to 
have shrunk significantly and become less diverse. The relationship between the Pennsylvania 
State Wetlands Center and state bureaucrats is no longer as strong or direct (Wardrop 2010). The 
leader of the assessment initiative in Pennsylvania now appears to be running it almost 
independently. It is not clear whether this individual has sought intra- or inter-agency support 
and been denied it, or has simply chosen to go it alone; some interviewees suggest the latter. The 
network is also notable for the structural holes it fails to bridge. State bureaucrats’ jobs are 
usually much easier when they have a cooperative relationship with U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers district regulators who also pursue wetland regulation in the state. However, one of the 
Corps districts that covers a wide swath of Pennsylvania has refused to engage with the state’s 
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assessment tool development process, and state bureaucrats involved in the assessment initiative 
have reportedly been equally unwilling to “court” that Corps district or any others.  
 There appears to be increasing skepticism among remaining members of the policy 
network concerning whether the state’s assessment tool will ever actually be used in regulatory 
applications. Members worry over the conflict with the Corps, the viability of the now-insulated 
tool development process, and assessment initiative’s recent history of delays and missed 
deadlines. One federal regulator recently worried that “things are going to get ugly” in 
Pennsylvania’s assessment attempt fairly soon.  
 These troubling network trends clearly have affected adoption and implementation 
outcomes. Regional experts have described Pennsylvania’s wetland assessment program as 
“confusing.” One federal regulator asked this author, only half-jokingly, “when you figure it out, 
can you tell us?” A key official in the state’s wetland assessment initiative reported that the state 
is planning to integrate its rapid assessment tool into regulatory use in the near future, but federal 
officials say that the state has been planning such a roll-out for years and has made little 
progress. In fact, a 2008 assay of the state’s wetland programs reported that in 2006 the state had 
completed and was field-testing an assessment protocol in preparation for regulatory roll-out 
(ELI 2008); this is essentially the same status report that a state bureaucrat provided via 
interviewee four years later. Pennsylvania is currently holding trainings to familiarize 
stakeholders with the current version of the tool, but state officials have already told participants 
that the tool will be revised again before it is actually used. 
 The larger, more permeable, weaker-tie network that facilitated the early stages of tool 
adoption in Pennsylvania seems to have contracted too soon. The network reached potentially 
implementation-facilitating conditions while adoption processes still needed to occur. The 
associated withdrawal/consolidation of resources (information, human capital) and closing of 
ranks (cohesion) on an incomplete tool concept not yet suitable for implementation stalled the AI 
cycle before implementation could begin.  
 
Figure 8 
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4.5 Virginia 
 Virginia is unique among the states in the sample in that state environmental agencies are 
in some cases legally required to rely on the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences (VIMS) for 
technical advice. The research institute is roughly 60 years old, employs 450 staff with technical 
expertise, and has served as an objective scientific advisor to state agencies throughout its history 
(Hershner and Havens 2010). Virginia’s non-tidal wetland regulatory program was established in 
2001 and its bureaucrats immediately had access to VIMS’ well-established, far-reaching 
network of experts interested in science policy innovation.  
VIMS staff members appear to have multiple strong ties to wetland policy-interested 
researchers, policy experts, and bureaucrats across the region. Virginia wetland bureaucrats also 
work with researchers at Virginia Tech and staff at other state agencies, such as the Virginia 
Department of Transportation, on wetland assessment issues. State wetland bureaucrats have 
participated in MAWWG since the group’s inception. The policy network that has surrounded 
Virginia’s non-tidal wetland program since its establishment appears large, characterized by 
diverse weak ties, and permeable. 
 This network has helped Virginia adopt a sophisticated wetland assessment program. The 
Virginia approach incorporates a rapid wetland assessment component as part of a three-pronged 
strategy that also involves GIS analysis and intensive field-level verification. The assessment 
program has been in development since 2003 and is regionally recognized as scientifically 
advanced. However, Virginia’s state agencies have not taken the final step and integrated 
assessment into regulatory activities despite an ostensible interest in doing so. Rather, state 
bureaucrats and members of the policy network seem stuck in late-adoption but pre-
implementation phase of tool revisions.  
VIMS and state wetland regulators are on their sixth round of revisions of the most 
current iteration of the rapid wetland assessment tool (Hershner and Havens 2010). State 
bureaucrats have pilot-tested the tool in some parts of the state and have begun introducing the 
tool to staff at other wetland regulatory agencies such as EPA. Bureaucrats recently contracted 
with Virginia Tech to review permit files against aerial photographs to determine where wetland 
impacts have occurred legally and illegally, and then build these data into the wetland 
assessment tool such that the tool would help a user evaluate cumulative impacts. Staff members 
also are applying for EPA funds to modify the assessment approach so that it can better apply to 
linear projects, a revision state staffers say will take three to five years. State staff members say 
that the first version of the rapid assessment tool should be ready for regulatory roll-out in two to 
three years, but note that they are consciously “taking baby steps” and “moving slowly” to 
ensure that they only use relevant, high-quality data and measures.  
There are a variety of reasons why regulators in the state may be approaching 
implementation so slowly. This pace may not be strictly required by the state of the science or 
the tool itself; at least one regional expert noted that by this point, the state should be ready just 
to get on with implementation. One compelling argument is that state staff members find doing 
so difficult when their large and diverse policy network keeps bringing them interesting and 
innovative components that could be added to the tool, allowing them to delay an 
implementation process that is bound to be politically and potentially legally tricky. The policy 
network has never contracted, and thus members have never closed ranks on the rapid 
assessment tool and pushed it forward using the energies of a small, committed, tightly knit 
group. 
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Figure 9 
 
 
4.6 West Virginia 
 The policy network devoted to wetland assessment in West Virginia appears relatively 
large, diverse (weak ties), and permeable to ideas and staff. It is also relatively young; the state 
only began participating in MAWWG in 2004, the same year it requested its first grant from 
EPA to fund the establishment of reference sites that would allow the development of a wetland 
assessment tool. State bureaucrats themselves reported that they only began serious work on 
wetland assessment approximately four years ago. At that time, the wetland assessment policy 
network in the state was still rather small and tight-knit. It consisted mainly of state bureaucrats 
who did not necessarily have many connections to non-bureaucrats; a leader of the nationally 
recognized Association of State Wetland Managers, for example, reports having had limited 
contact with wetland regulators from the state (Christie 2010). 
 However, in the mid-2000s, bureaucrats at the West Virginia Department of Natural 
Resources began working with scientists at West Virginia University to develop a rapid wetland 
assessment tool (Anderson 2010). Those scientists then worked with wetland assessment experts 
nationwide to craft the tool, selecting from tools used in California, Ohio, Montana, Oregon and 
other states the pieces and parts that seem most amenable to West Virginia’s resources 
(Anderson 2010, Veselka 2010). This tool “cannibalization” (in the words of one WVU 
researcher) expanded the policy network significantly.  
 Although West Virginia began its wetland assessment initiative later than other states in 
the region, one federal expert said that the state’s pace toward adoption and implementation 
seems quicker than that of some other states in the region (Poeske 2010). The West Virginia 
Rapid Wetland Assessment Procedure was developed and internally quality checked by the end 
of 2009 (WVDNR 2009). In 2010, field crews tested the tool on 100 randomly selected sites 
statewide, and aim to have tested the tool at 1000 different sites by the end of the summer of 
2012 (ERC 2010). Once the tool is finalized, it is the “vision and hope” of policy network 
members that it will be used in wetland regulatory permitting (Kordek 2009). 
 Consistent with theory, the expansion and increased permeability and diversity of the 
state’s policy network allowed for tool adoption. Now, members of the policy network are 
steering the tool towards implementation. There are some possible signs that the policy network 
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is contracting in an implementation-facilitative manner. For example, after drawing on wetland 
expertise in other states, West Virginia tool developers turned their attention inward, focusing on 
which elements were best suited to West Virginia (Kordek 2010) and thus giving less attention to 
their regional and national weak ties. In interviews, state bureaucrats responsible for the wetland 
assessment initiative emphasized the importance of getting a collection of key individuals 
“onboard” with the idea of regulatory use, including staff members from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and at the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. Core members of 
the network thus may recognize that bonding social capital and strong ties with a select, small 
group of highly relevant actors facilitates tool implementation; however, it remains to be seen 
whether the policy network will achieve this transformation: 
 
Figure 10 
 
5.0 Discussion 
 The case sketches illustrate the correlations between adoption-implementation and policy 
network expansion-contraction cycles theorized at the outset. However, there are some important 
considerations this analysis does not address. 
 First, the composition of the policy networks likely impacts adoption and 
implementation, but in this analysis, “critical actors” remain undifferentiated. It may be 
consequential whether the policy network is dominated by government actors, for example, 
versus university scientists. Also, in Delaware, Ohio, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, there were or 
are one or two actors who clearly were linchpins in progress toward or delays in adoption and 
implementation. The way these network “stars” (Carrington, Scott, and Wasserman 2005) 
influence AI and EC cycles should be more closely examined. 
 Second, and relatedly, when the policy network expands or contracts, it is likely that 
some actors on the periphery of the network take on more central roles, and vice-versa. For 
example, in a network facilitative of adoption, scientists who can bring innovative ideas to the 
table appear to play a valued role. However, in a network facilitative of implementation, 
bureaucrats who can “bulldog” the assessment program through implementation challenges will 
be more active and valued (Sumner 2011). Scientists will move to the periphery, perhaps only 
consulted when there is a substantive question about the tool. Which actors shift location in the 
policy network, and how and when, is an issue that requires more study. 
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 The third issue is one touched on in Section 2.2: the age of the policy network. A recently 
formed policy network may behave differently than a more mature one. The ways in which 
networks collect, retain, or shed members and the kinds of bonds that develop among members 
may change over time. These dynamics must be explored further. 
 Fourth, while the ways policy entrepreneurs or larger external forces affect the pace and 
trajectory of AI and EC cycles can be observed in hindsight, it remains unclear whether these 
propositions are predictive. More data and analysis are necessary to explore this question and to 
test the theory beyond the cases from which it was developed. 
 Finally, this analysis treats the likelihood and extent of adoption and implementation of a 
rapid wetland assessment tool as separate from the suitability of the tool for the resource, the 
scientific rigor of the tool, the tool’s fit with the standard operating procedures of the bureaucrats 
who must implement it, and the relevant socioeconomic or political contexts. These variables 
enter the analysis when bureaucrats consider them when contemplating whether and how to 
adopt and implement. In reality, though, these are consequential independent variables which 
may matter more to practitioners than the network variables, particularly to the extent that these 
variables affect resources directly (e.g., if the science behind a tool is flawed, the tool’s 
“successful” adoption and implementation, as defined by a policy scholar, may actually harm the 
resource). A fundamental challenge of this research is finding a way to evaluate the impact these 
variables have on adoption and implementation outcomes relative to, or in combination with, the 
network variables. 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
 The permeability, size, and tie strength of policy networks appears to affect whether and 
the pace at which state bureaucracies adopt and implement science policy innovations. Adoption 
and implementation are continuous rather than binary variables; they are processes that are 
linked cyclically. Networks expand and contract cyclically along the noted policy dimensions. A 
correct alignment of adoption-implementation and network expansion-contraction cycles 
increases the likelihood that adoption and implementation will occur and progress. Policy 
entrepreneurs as well as larger external influences contribute to alignment or misalignment. 
 These propositions were illustrated by case sketches describing the attempts of six states 
in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States to adopt and implement rapid wetland assessment 
tools. The policy outcomes in the case sketches are largely supportive of the propositions. 
However, the propositions must address some potentially important variables for which they 
currently do not account. The propositions require further development and out-of-sample 
testing. 
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